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PARTIES 
The Plaintiff/Appellant is Marlene A. Terpening (hereinafter "Terpening"). 
The Defendant/Appellee is RTM Restaurant Group and RTM Operating 
Company (hereinafter "RTM"). 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Did the trial court (the "Trial Court") abuse its discretion in denying 
Terpening's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
where: 1) neither party received proper notification of the Trial Court's dismissal, 2) 
Terpening's motion was timely under the circumstances, and 3) Terpening maintained 
a meritorious claim? 
Standard of Review 
An appellate court will reverse a trial court's decision regarding motions to 
relieve a party from a final judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) where 
an abuse of discretion is clearly established. Airkem Intermountain Inc. v. Parker, 513 
P.2d429,431 (Utah 1973). 
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STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (2004): 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
Court Rules: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding, for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not made more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2)(D): 
A party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of 
judgment under Rule 58A(d). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A(d): 
A copy of the signed judgment shall be promptly served by the party 
preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a 
notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this provision. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On November 20, 1997, Terpening entered an Arby's Restaurant, owned and 
operated by RTM, located in West Valley City, Utah. After ordering food, Terpening 
turned toward the dining room. Before walking towards the dining room, an 
employee of the restaurant assured Terpening that it was safe to walk across a tile 
floor that he had recently mopped. While attempting to walk across the tile floor, she 
fell face-first onto the hard tile and carpeted area of the dining room. As she fell, she 
put her arms out to brace herself, but the impact caused multiple injuries, including 
damage to her right arm and right wrist, tearing and detachment of her left and right 
rotator cuffs, a sprained left ankle, bruised ribs, and soft tissue damage to her right 
shoulder. 
Course of Proceedings/Disposition in Trial Court 
Terpening filed a complaint against RTM on January 4, 1999. On July 7, 2000, 
the Trial Court held a hearing on an Order to Show Cause, at which Thomas Shaffer 
appeared as counsel for Terpening and Royal Hansen appeared as counsel for RTM. 
At the hearing, the Trial Court granted a thirty-day continuance, but stated that if no 
pleadings were filed within that period, the court would dismiss the case. 
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During the thirty-day period, the parties sent correspondence to each other. 
During July 2000, in order to conduct a deposition, RTM requested information from 
Terpening about her sister. This information was provided by Terpening through 
correspondence. 
Without notice to the parties, on August 10, 2000, the Trial Court, acting on its 
own motion, dismissed Terpening's case without prejudice based on the Court's Order 
to Show Cause and the parties' failure to file any pleadings. Notice of the dismissal 
was never sent to, or received by, counsel for either party or the parties themselves. 
Therefore, both parties continued to act as if the matter was still pending. Throughout 
the rest of the year 2000, and early into 2001, both parties continued to conduct 
discovery. By March 2001, RTM requested a resolution of the matter, and Terpening 
responded by sending a settlement package to RTM's counsel in April 2001. 
In March 2002, Thomas Shaffer left the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin and 
left the case with Todd Emerson. In September 2003, Todd Emerson left the law firm 
of Fabian & Clendenin and turned the file over to David Kelley. Shortly thereafter, 
Mr. Kelley learned that the case had been dismissed by the Trial Court in August 
2000, but no notice of dismissal had ever been received by the parties or their 
counsels. 
-nn-ni 1 n o r X 
On October 14, 2003, Terpening filed a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal with the 
District Court, and RTM filed a Memorandum in Opposition. On March 24, 2004, the 
District Court denied Terpening's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal on the grounds set 
forth in RTM's Memorandum in Opposition. Terpening now appeals the Trial 
Court's refusal to set aside the dismissal of her case. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On November 20, 1997, Terpening entered an Arby's Restaurant located 
at 3500 South 3215 West, West Valley City, Utah. (Record at 2). 
2. As she entered the Arby's store she saw an employee mopping the tile 
floor between the service counter and dining room. She went to the service counter to 
order dinner. (Record at 46). 
3. Terpening then turned toward the dining room and asked an Arby's 
employee whether it was safe to cross the floor, which then appeared to be dry. 
(Record at 41). 
4. The employee assured Terpening that the floor was safe to cross, so she 
walked across the tile floor. (Record at 40-41). 
5. At this point Terpening slipped on the floor and fell face-first on the hard 
tile and carpeted area of the dining room. (Record at 46-49). 
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6. Reflexively, she put her arms out to brace her fall. The impact broke her 
right arm and right wrist, tore and detached both her left and right rotator cuffs, 
sprained her left ankle, bruised her ribs, and caused soft tissue damage to her right 
shoulder. Terpening was in excruciating pain and was taken directly to the Pioneer 
Valley Hospital Emergency Room for treatment. (Record at 52-53, 54-57). 
7. Terpening filed a complaint on or about January 4, 1999, thereby 
commencing the present action. (Record at 1-5). 
8. On or about July 7, 2000, the Court held a hearing on an Order to Show 
Cause at which Thomas Schaffer appeared for and on behalf of Terpening, and Royal 
Hansen appeared on behalf of RTM. (Record at 24). 
9. At the hearing, the Court granted a thirty-day continuance stating, "If no 
pleadings are filed within the allotted time, the Court will automatically dismiss this 
case." Id. 
10. On or about July 19,2000, RTM served on Terpening an Amended 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Terpening's sister. (Record at 91-93). 
11. On or about July 19,2000, Terpening further sent a letter to counsel for 
Terpening requesting contact information for Terpening's sister. (Record at 95). 
12. On or about July 21,2000, counsel for Terpening sent a letter to counsel 
for RTM providing the requested information. (Record at 97). 
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13. On or about July 25, 2000, a subsequent letter containing further 
information was sent to counsel for RTM. (Record at 99). 
14. On or about August 10,2000, the Court, on its own motion, dismissed 
the case without prejudice based on the Court's Order to Show Cause for dismissal. 
(Record at 25). 
15. Notice of the Court's dismissal was not sent to either party or their 
attorneys. Id. 
16. There is no certificate of mailing by the court clerk that the order of 
dismissal was mailed to either of the parties. Id. 
17. On September 22, 2000, Terpening sent a letter enclosing Terpening's 
medical records. 
18. On March 21, 2001, RTM requested a demand for resolution of the 
matter. (Record at 101). 
19. On April 19, 2001, Terpening sent a settlement package to counsel for 
RTM. (Record at 103-06). 
20. The parties, without notice of the Court's dismissal, continued to conduct 
discovery throughout the remainder of 2000, as well as 2001. The following 
Subpoenas Duces Tecum were sent: 
a. July 20, 2001 to Walgreen's Pharmacy 
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b. July 20, 2001 to Pioneer Valley Hospital 
c. July 20, 2001 to John F. Berman, M.D. 
d. July 20,2001 to Fremont Orthopedic Medical Group 
e. July 20,2001 to Washington Hospital Health Care System 
f. July 20, 2001 to Kaiser Permanente 
g. July 20, 2001 to Highland General Hospital 
h. August 31, 2001 to Fremont Hospital 
i. August 31, 2001 to Rite-Aid Pharmacies 
j . September 12, 2001 to Rite-Aid Pharmacies 
(Record at 108-47). 
21. In March 2002, Mr. Schaffer left the firm of Fabian and Clendenin. At 
that time, Terpening's case was transferred to Todd Emerson. 
22. In September 2003, then existing counsel for Terpening, Todd Emerson, 
left the law firm of Fabian and Clendenin and turned the file over to David N. Kelley. 
23. Upon researching the status of the case, Mr. Kelley discovered that the 
case had been dismissed in August 2000, but that no notice had been provided to 
either of the parties or their counsel. (Record at 25). 
24. On or about October 14, 2003, Terpening filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Dismissal. (Record at 148-50). 
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25. On or about March 24, 2004, the Trial Court denied Terpening's Motion 
to Set Aside Dismissal. (Record at 167-69). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Terpening's Motion to Set 
Aside Dismissal. To vacate a default judgment, a movant must show that she has 
reasons justifying the setting aside of the dismissal of her case under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), that her motion is timely, and that she maintains a 
meritorious claim. Terpening meets each of these requirements. Therefore, this Court 
should vacate the Trial Court's decision regarding dismissal and allow this case to 
proceed at the trial stage. 
First, Terpening maintains valid, legitimate reasons for setting aside her 
dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6). By denying Terpening's motion, the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in not allowing justice to be served in allowing Terpening her 
day in court. Furthermore, the dismissal of her case without proper notification 
denied Terpening due process of law and the rights conferred upon her under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 5 and 5 8 A, which require reversal of her dismissal due to 
lack of notification. Also, without proper notice of the dismissal from the Trial Court, 
Terpening was not allowed an opportunity to refile her claims under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-40. These reasons justified setting aside the dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6). 
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Second, without receiving notice of the Trial Court's dismissal of the case, both 
Terpening and RTM continued to litigate the case as if it was still active. Once 
Terpening's counsel learned of the Trial Court's dismissal, they quickly filed their 
motion to set the dismissal aside. Given the circumstances and nature of this case, the 
motion was timely. Third, Terpening has maintained at all times a meritorious claim. 
Under Utah's negligence theories, Terpening can show that RTM is liable for the 
injuries she received from her slip-and-fall accident in an Arby's Restaurant. 
Because Terpening provided all the necessary requirements for vacating a 
default judgment, her Motion to Set Aside Dismissal should have been granted by the 
Trial Court. In sum, the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying her motion. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the Trial Court's decision regarding the dismissal 
and remand the case back for further proceedings. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
TERPENING'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL BECAUSE 
TERPENING MAINTAINED LEGITIMATE REASONS JUSTIFYING 
RELIEF FROM THE JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b)(6), HER 
MOTIOIN TO SET ASIDE THE DISMISSAL WAS TIMELY UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SHE MAINTAINED A MERITORIOUS CLAIM. 
The Utah Supreme Court holds that the "trial court is endowed with 
considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a 
party from a final judgment under [Rule 60(b)], and [an appellate court] will 
reverse the trial court only where an abuse of discretion is clearly established." 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429,430 (Utah 1973). However, 
Utah courts hold that a trial court's discretion is not without limits. Specifically, a 
trial court's discretion "should be exercised in the furtherance of justice and 
should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the 
party may have a hearing." Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079,1081 (Utah 
1981) (citing Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953) (emphasis 
added)). Furthermore, as the Utah Supreme Court stated in Olsen v. Cummings, 
565 P.2d 1123,1124 (Utah 1977), "it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear and timely application 
is made to set it aside." Therefore, a "court should be generally indulgent toward 
setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the 
1 
defendant's failure to answer and when timely application is made." Katz v. 
Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). Consequently, "[w]here there is doubt about 
whether a default should be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor of 
doing so." Id. 
To vacate a default judgment, a movant has to "not only show that the 
judgment was entered against [her] through excusable neglect (or any other reasons 
specified in Rule 60(b)), but [s]he must also show that [her] motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely, and that [s]he has a meritorious [claim] to the action." State 
v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983). As shown below, the Trial 
Court abused its discretion in denying Terpening's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal 
because: (A) Terpening maintained reasonable justifications under Rule 60(b)(6) to 
set aside dismissal, (B) her motion was timely given the nature and history of this 
case, and (C) she maintained a meritorious claim. 
A. There Are Reasonable Justifications To Set Aside Default. 
To vacate a default judgment, a movant must "show that the judgment was 
entered against [her] through.. .reason[s] specified in Rule 60(b)." Musselman, 
667 P.2d at 1055. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
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discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall 
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
In this matter, setting aside dismissal was justified because: (1) by not providing 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Terpening was denied due process of law; (2) relief 
should have been granted in the furtherance of justice in this case; (3) by denying 
relief from the judgment, a violation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 occurred by 
not providing both Terpening and RTM proper notice of the dismissal of the case; 
and (4) Terpening could have timely refiled her claim under a savings statute if the 
Trial Court had properly notified the parties of the dismissal. 
1. Rule 60(b)(6) Provides for Relief From Judgment Where 
Plaintiff is Deprived Due Process of Law. 
The Court's order dismissing the case, dated August 10, 2000, should be set 
aside as it deprives Terpening of her case without due process of the law. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Bish 's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21, 22 (Utah 
1961), stated that one reason for justifying relief is not providing proper notice. As 
the court stated, "such a showing would establish lack of due process of law." Id. 
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Furthermore, the court held that such a showing would be entitled to relief from the 
judgment under what was then subsection (7), but is similar to the current 
subsection (6) providing for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment." Id. 
At the hearing held on the Court's Order to Show Cause, the Court ordered 
that the parties must file a pleading within thirty days or the case would be 
dismissed. (Record at 24). While the Complaint and Answer had already been 
filed, Terpening's counsel understood this directive to mean that the parties must 
take some action in furthering the case along. Approximately a week and a half 
later, RTM sent out an Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Elizabeth 
Terpening. (Record at 91-93). Terpening's counsel believed that the Notice had 
been filed with the court and that the Court's order regarding a filing had been 
fulfilled. Accordingly, the parties continued to go forward with the case without 
notice that the Court had dismissed the case. Terpening's counsel prepared and 
delivered a settlement package regarding possible negotiations (Record at 103-06). 
Furthermore, RTM's counsel continued to send out discovery requests (Record at 
108-47). 
At no time did the parties receive notice of any dismissal. The Court's own 
record is devoid of such notice. Both parties' actions demonstrate that no notice 
was given. Absent notice, the Trial Court's failure to set aside the dismissal denied 
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Terpening's rights to due process of law; therefore, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion. 
2. Relief From Dismissal Should Have Been Granted by the Trial 
Court in the Furtherance of Justice. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by not setting aside the dismissal of 
Terpening's case, which would have been in the furtherance of justice. Utah courts 
have held that "discretion should be exercised in furtherance of justice and should 
incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have 
a hearing." Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081. In Olsen, the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
"it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear and timely application 
is made to set it aside." 566P.2dat 1124. 
Furthermore, the court in Katz, 732 P.2d at 93, held that a "court should be 
generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse...[and w]here there is doubt about whether a default should 
be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so." In putting these 
legal doctrines into context, the Utah Supreme Court in Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 
75, f 20,11 P.3d 277,281, concluded that plaintiffs failure to provide notice of 
the default judgment proceedings justified the trial court's grant of defendant's 
motion to set aside the judgment. 
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Similarly, there was reasonable justification and excuse as neither Terpening 
nor her counsel ever received notice of the dismissal. At the hearing held on the 
Court's Order to Show Cause, the Court ordered that the parties must file a 
pleading within thirty days or the case would be dismissed. (Record at 24). While 
the pleadings (i.e. the Complaint and Answer) had already been filed, Terpening's 
counsel understood this directive to mean that the parties must take some action in 
furthering the case along. 
Approximately a week and a half later, defendants sent out an Amended 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Elizabeth Terpening. (Record at 91-93). Counsel 
for the plaintiff believed that the Notice had been filed with the court and that the 
Court's order regarding a filing had been fulfilled. Moreover, there had been no 
notice of a dismissal. Thus, the parties continued with the litigation as if the 
lawsuit remained active. For example, counsel for Terpening prepared and 
delivered a settlement package to open up negotiations (Record at 103-06), and 
counsel for RTM continued to send out discovery requests (Record at 108-147). 
In short, all parties believed and acted as if the matter remained open. There 
was no contrary notice. Each of the parties continued to seek additional evidence 
to bolster their case. Each party continued to advocate its own clients' position. In 
essence, each party acted as if there had been no dismissal in this case (which until 
recently was the belief of the parties). Consequently, the Trial Court abused its 
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discretion in denying Terpening's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal by not allowing 
justice to be carried out, as both parties continued to litigate the pending claims due 
to the Trial Court's failure to notify them to the contrary. 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) Required Reversal of the 
Dismissal. 
Failure by the Trial Court to abide by Rule 5(a) constituted an additional 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, as Rule 60(b)(6) 
provides. Rule 5(a)(2)(D) states that a party in default for any reason shall be 
served with notice of entry of a judgment under Rule 5 8 A(d). While interpreting 
the notice requirements of Rule 5, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "by appearing at 
any time in the action, a party becomes entitled to have his attorney notified of all 
subsequent proceedings and receive copies of all papers, even if he later chooses to 
default." Lund, 2000 UT 75, f 26, 11 P.3d at 282 (citing Wright et al., supra PI 1, 
§ 1144, at 416 (footnotes omitted)); see also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 
F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that defendants' appearance entitled him to 
service of all papers, including the summary judgment motion made and granted 
after defendants had been defaulted). 
Similarly, in the present case, Rule 5(a)(2)(D) was not followed, and 
because it was not followed, Terpening has lost her cause of action. It is clear 
from the actions of each of the parties that neither had notice of the dismissal, and 
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each believed that the case was progressing. For over a year after the Court's 
dismissal, the parties continued to conduct discovery, subpoena medical records, 
and conduct negotiations for possible settlement. Thus, it is evident that there was 
no notice of the dismissal, which Terpening and RTM both should have received 
from the Trial Court once the August 10,2000 order dismissed the case. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court abused its discretion in not granting Terpening's 
Motion to Set Aside Dismissal, since neither party received notice of the order 
dismissing the case as is required by Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RTM argued at the Trial Court that these rules of civil procedure did not 
apply, because notice of the entry of judgment was only required to be given "by 
the party preparing [the judgment]." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 58A(d). 
Therefore, because the Trial Court acted on its own motion to dismiss Terpening's 
case, RTM argued that the Trial Court was not a "party" for purposes of Rule 
58A(d). (Record at 157 n. 7). Even though RTM was not the "party" preparing 
the judgment due to the Trial Court's action on its own motion, Terpening still 
should have received proper notice of the dismissal from the Trial Court under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5(a). In sum, the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
not granting Terpening's motion because Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) 
required a reversal of the dismissal for lack of proper notification. 
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4. Setting Aside the Dismissal Would be Proper Because Terpening 
Could Have Timely Refiled her Claims under a Savings Statute 
if the Trial Court Gave Notice of the Dismissal. 
Utah law affords plaintiffs the opportunity to timely re-file their action 
within one year if the action fails for any reason not on the merits of the claims. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (2004) (the "Savings Statute"): 
[I]f the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff.. .may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
See also Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,254 (Utah 1988) (holding investors' 
suit not time-barred when original suit was dismissed and new suit was re-filed 
within one year under the savings statute). The Trial Court dismissed Terpening's 
claims without prejudice due to the failure of any of the parties to file any 
pleadings within 30 days after the Court's Order to Show Cause. (Record at 24-
25). Neither Terpening nor RTM received notice of the dismissal. If Terpening 
had received proper notice, she could have re-filed her claim within one year after 
the dismissal under the Savings Statute. Because the Trial Court never provided 
any notice of dismissal, the one year period for re-filing Terpening's claims lapsed, 
making it too late for Terpening to re-file. Therefore, the Trial Court's failure to 
give notice of the dismissal to Terpening, deprived her of the right to re-file within 
one year as provided by the Savings Statute. 
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B. Based on the History and Nature of This Case, Terpening's 
Motion to Set Aside Dismissal was Timely. 
Once Terpening's counsel discovered the case had been dismissed in 
September 2003, Terpening's counsel quickly filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Dismissal in October 2003 (Record at 148-50); therefore, the motion was timely 
and the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying the motion partly on the 
grounds that Terpening was not diligent in "mov[ing] the case forward." (Record 
at 167-69) To vacate a judgment, a movant "must also show that his motion to set 
aside the judgment was timely." Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056. Under Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b), a "motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken." The Utah Court of Appeals held that 
"[sjubsection [(6)] may not be employed for relief when the grounds asserted are 
encompassed within subsection (1)... [otherwise, the three-month time limitation 
for filing motions pursuant to subsection (1) would be circumvented." Classic 
Cabinets, Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App 88, \ 14, 978 P.2d 465, 
469 (citing Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T.S. Properties, 838 P.2d 672, 674-75 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
Terpening's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal was not based on any of the 
reasons enumerated in the first three parts of Rule 60(b); therefore, the three month 
time limit did not apply to her motion. As argued above and at trial, Terpening and 
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RTM never received notification from the Trial Court about the dismissal of the 
case. Both parties continued to act as if the case remained open and actively 
litigated it by conducting discovery, by supplying and requesting information to 
the respective counsels, and by offering settlement proposals. Once Terpening's 
counsel learned that the Trial Court dismissed the case on its own motion, 
Terpening filed a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal shortly afterward; hence, it was 
timely given the circumstances and nature of the case. 
Furthermore, as argued above, Terpening's motion was based largely on the 
fact that other reasons justified the Trial Court in setting aside the dismissal of her 
case under Rule 60(b)(6). Because she never received proper notification of the 
dismissal, Terpening, along with RTM, continued to pursue the case. Therefore, in 
denying her motion, Terpening was denied a hearing on her claims in the 
furtherance of justice. Furthermore, the fact that she never received proper 
notification of the dismissal was a violation of due process and Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 5(a). All of these reasons justified setting aside the dismissal of 
Terpening's case under 60(b)(6), and they were not reasons enumerated in Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(l-3), which only allow for motions filed within 
three months. In sum, the reasons for setting aside dismissal of Terpening's case 
were properly governed under Rule 60(b)(6), and her motion was not limited by a 
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three-month time limitation. Therefore, the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
holding that Terpening's motion should fail due to untimeliness. 
C. Terpening's Claims are Meritorious and Warranted Granting 
Her Motion to Set Aside the Dismissal. 
At all times during the course of this litigation, Terpening has maintained 
legitimate and meritorious claims in her case, which warrant this Court in granting 
her appeal to set aside the dismissal. To vacate a judgment, a movant must show 
that there is a meritorious claim in her action. Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056. 
Terpening was an invitee of RTM's restaurant, and therein encountered a 
potentially dangerous condition. When she questioned an employee of RTM about 
the potentially dangerous condition, the employee assured her that it was safe to 
walk across. As plaintiff walked across the tile floor, she slipped and fell. The fall 
resulted in severe injuries for which RTM is clearly liable. 
In Merino v. Albertson 's, Inc., 1999 UT 14, ft 5-6, 975 P.2d 467, 478, the 
court indicated that there were two theories under which a plaintiff may recover 
against a business owner for injuries arising from a slip-and-fall accident. Under 
the one theory, liability may be established where two conditions are met. "First, a 
plaintiff must show that the business owner knew or should have known of the 
hazardous condition. Second, a plaintiff must show that the business owner had 
enough time to remedy the unsafe condition had the owner exercised reasonable 
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care, and that the owner failed to do so." Id. at f 5. Here, the hazardous condition 
was clearly known, and in fact created by the business owner and/or his employee. 
Mopping the floor with either just water, or soap and water, created a hazardous 
condition, as the area on which guests walked became wet tile. Furthermore, the 
owner knew about and should have warned Terpening not to cross the wet tile area. 
However, through its agent, the owner assured Terpening that there was no unsafe 
condition. Relying on the employee's assurances, Terpening crossed the wet tile 
floor, and slipped and fell. The impact resulted in sever injuries and substantial 
medical needs. 
RTM's argument that Terpening's claims are of questionable merit is 
baseless. Regardless of whether Terpening saw the employee mopping the floor or 
whether she walked over the floor under the assumption that the floor was wet, 
Terpening established that she has a valid claim for her slip-and-fall accident under 
the guidelines of Merino. She can show that the business owner knew or should 
have known of the hazardous condition of the floor and maintained enough time to 
remedy the situation. 
In sum, Terpening's claim has merit. She was injured as the result of RTM' 
negligence. As a result, justice dictates that this Court set aside the dismissal and 
reopen this matter for adjudication in the Trial Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the Trial Court's Minute 
Entry and Decision of Order, which upheld the dismissal of Terpening's case, and 
remand the case for further proceedings with the Trial Court. 
DATED thisZZ'&iy of October 2004. 
-DAVID N.KELLEY 
J. DAVID PEARCE 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
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